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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900158-CA

v.
Category No. 2

MICHAEL STEWARD,
Defendant-Appellant•

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of unlawful possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990); and
unlawful possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990), as the appeal is from a
district court in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a
first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court was correct in determining

that the initial stop of defendant's vehicle was lawful.

The

standard for reviewing a trial court's legal conclusion regarding
a motion to suppress is the correction of error standard.

State

v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,
P.2d

(Utah 1989).

2.

Whether the trial court was correct in determining

that the search of defendant and his vehicle was lawful.
Defendant has not analyzed the legality of the search of his
vehicle.

This Court may decline to address issues which have not

been properly analyzed and presented to it.
689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).

State v. Amicone,

The standard of reviewing the

court's decision on the search of defendant's person is the
correction of error standard.

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326,

327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 19, 1989, defendant was charged with
unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990), and unlawful possession of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 67).

Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from

him "as a result of the stop of the defendant's vehicle and the
search of said vehicle" (R. at 13). The motion to suppress was
heard on January 2, 1990, and was denied (R. at 14 and 53
[transcript of suppression hearing 1/2/90]).

Findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and an order denying the motion were signed
by the trial court after the trial (R. at 20-24).

-2-

The matter was tried to the bench on January 26, 1990,
in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, district judge, presiding (R. at 19,
and 54 and 55 [transcripts of bench trial 1/26/90]).

The court

found defendant guilty of both charges (R. at 19 and 55). On
March 5, 1990, defendant was sentenced to two consecutive terms
of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined.

The

prison terms were stayed and defendant placed on probation with
certain conditions (R. at 31-33).

A notice of appeal was filed

on March 14, 1990, and an application for certificate of probable
cause was denied by the trial court on March 29, 1990 (R. at 3549).

This Court subsequently granted a certificate of probable

cause and defendant's sentence has been stayed pending this
appeal (R. at 50-52).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 20, 1989, members of the Metro Narcotics task
force obtained search warrants for three houses in a cul-de-sac
off Lead Mine Road in Bingham Canyon (R. 53 at 38 and R. 54 at
25).

There were three other houses in the cul-de-sac which had

no involvement in the searches (R. 53 at 38). The Metro
Narcotics team asked the Salt Lake City SWAT team to assist them
in securing the area during the searches (R. 53 at 4). The SWAT
team was asked to make the initial entry into the houses, then
set up a perimeter around the search area for security (R. 53 at
4-6).

This request was based on the officers' knowledge that the

houses probably contained a methamphetamine lab and that the
presence of volatile substances used in making methamphetamine

-3-

was very likely (R. 53 at 11, and 36-41).

The officers also were

aware that there was a high likelihood of weapons in the houses
(R. 53 at 37).
The houses were entered and searched prior to
defendant's arrival (R. 53 at 23). A functional methamphetamine
lab and large packages of marijuana were found in one house and
chemicals for preparing methamphetamine in another (R. 53 at 3940).

Weapons such as handguns, shotguns, rifles, knives, and

crossbows were found in all three houses (R. 53 at 39). Based on
the discovery of these items, the officers' concern about the
explosive nature of the chemicals used in making methamphetamine,
the congested nature of the cul-de-sac with all of the police
vehicles, and officer safety, the Metro officers directed the
SWAT team to stop all vehicles entering the cul-de-sac and
ascertain to which house they were en route (R. 53 at 8, 14, 22,
and 40-41 and R. 54 at 6).
The SWAT officers stopped all vehicles which turned
into the cul-de-sac to determine their business and whether their
occupants could be safely allowed into the cul-de-sac.

If the

occupant indicated that he or she was going to a house other than
one being searched, the officers would escort him or her to the
home (R. 54 at 6 and 18). If the driver indicated a destination
which was one of the houses being searched, the officers held the
person for the one to two minutes it took for a Metro detective
to reach the stopped vehicle and check the identity of the
visitor.

Metro was looking for other individuals who were

involved in the labs and whom they had seen while conducting
surveillance (R. 54 at 19).
-4-

At approximately 11:50 p.m., defendan t turned h i s
pickup into the cul-de-sac

53 at 12 and R. 54 at 5 - 7 ) .

The

SWAT team oiiieers st,e . •

c: I .he street and flagged him down,

identifying themselves a^ police officers (R. 53 at 12 and 3] ai id
R. 54 at 7, 14-15 and 21-22).
quickly put his vehicle

Defendant stopped, then either

in .reverse or all owed it to roll backward

down the slight grade (R. 53 at 12-13, 21, and 30 and P . *54 -,- 8
and 1 6 - 1 7 ) .
53 at 1 3 ) .

Defendant looked "kind of panicky or startled"

(R.

One of the officers opened defendant's door and told

him to stop, then asked him where he was going
R. 54 at 8 ) .

D

"

*+ 14 and

Defendant said he was visiting a friend at the end

of the cul-de-sac, then gave tl le nan t.e of the occupant of one of
the houses being searched (R, 53 at 15 and R. 54 at 9 and 2 0 ) .
The officers asked defendant to get out of the pickup, which he
did.

The officers patted defendant down dhd checked the

the pickup for weapons (R. 53 at 15 and 25-26 and R

;ab of

54 at 9-10).

Officer Adair, from t.he SWA'^1 t earn, shined his flashlight into the
cab and saw an open blue gym bag on the floor on the passenger
side.

He also saw the tops of plastic baggies in the gym bag (R.

53 at if

.

A5 officer Adair patted down

defendant, other officers checked the cab for weapons (F

it

26).
Vht.hin a niinuu1 nl hi ,.

clefftmlani, the SWAT team

officers radioed to Detective Huggard at the search site that
i.hpv Ihi'ii stoppea a vehicle with suspected marijuana In It (R. 53
at 4.1),

Within five minutes of the repoi

)el:ect.ive Hu'-iyard

arrived at defendant's pickup and saw defendant standing outside

-5-

(R. 53 at 44 and R. 54 at 25).

Detective Huggard looked into the

passenger window of the pickup and saw the blue gym bag on the
floor with plastic baggies of suspected marijuana inside; some of
the baggies were hanging out of the gym bag (R. 53 at 42 and R.
54 at 26-27).

The detective retrieved the gym bag, which

contained four baggies with suspected marijuana and numerous
empty baggies (R. 54 at 27).

Detective Huggard placed defendant

under arrest (R. 53 at 42).
Detective Huggard picked up a leather jacket from the
seat of the pickup, intending to give it to defendant to put on
because it was a cool evening and the officers were going to take
defendant to one of the houses (R. 53 at 43 and R. 54 at 29).
Defendant indicated that the jacket was his (R. 53 at 43 at R. 54
at 29). Detective Huggard checked the jacket for weapons and
felt a package which he pulled out to check for a gun.

The

package turned out to be a wallet with $4,000.00 and a bindle of
white, powdery substance (R. 53 at 43 and R. 54 at 29-30).

The

money was broken down into forty $100.00 bundles, each done up in
an elastic band (R. 54 at 12 and 30-31).

Another officer later

searched defendant further and found an additional $1257.00 in
defendant's front jeans pocket (R. 54 at 62).
The substances retrieved from defendant's pickup and
person were analyzed and determined to be marijuana and
methamphetamine (R. 54 at 74-75).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was a proper
seizure because the officers had specific and articulable reasons

-6-

to suspect criminal activity.

They had served search warrants in

three of the si x houses in the cul-de-sac and found a
methamphetanii i ie J ab

exp] osive

*

Is used in making

methaitiphetamine, and numerous weapons

This gave them reasonable

grounds to stop all vehicles turning into the cul-de-sac and
ascertain to which fit use each vehicle was goi ng

Once the

officers determined that defendant was going to one of the
suspect houses, in a vehicle which could have been used to
transport precursor chemicals, they had

_,

detain

defendant and maintain the status quo while there was further
invest i gation.

The Metro Narcotic detectives had outstanding

warrants for individuals connected wi th tl ieir surveillance of the
suspect houses,

A brief detention of vehicles while the officers

checked to see i £ the occupants were involved was reasonable.
After defendant was stopped based on the

aDove

Lacti-is,

he tried to reverse his vehicle when the officers identified
themselves.

Thi s acti on, coupled with all of the other factors,

justified a further detention and cursory search of defendant and
his vehicle for weapons.
Defendant has failed to provide any further analysis of
his claim that the search of his vehicle after the initial stop
was unlawful.

He bases that allegation solely

the initial stop was i.mlawfu.l

Cons

. •-

• *

s

LUUIL

determines that the trial court was correct in concluding that
the in it id I
the legality

"

was xctwiul, the Court should decline t« address
:he search o

The search of defendant himself, and of his clothing,
was conducted incident to his arrest and was lawful on that
basis.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL STOP AND DETENTION OF DEFENDANT
WAS VALID.
Defendant first contends that his initial stop and
detention by the officers was unlawful.

In response to

defendant's motion to suppress, and after a hearing on the
motion, the trial court signed findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and an order denying the motion (R. at 21-23; a copy is
attached as Addendum A ) .

The court found that the officers had

reasonable suspicion justifying a "temporary seizure" of
defendant (R. at 22). The court specifically found:
1. That evidence showing that defendant
approached the area in a pickup truck, which
vehicle was consistent with those types used
to deliver chemicals and supplies to the drug
laboratory, and the time of day being late in
the evening hours, which evidence shows is
the time of choice for customers of drug
dealers, and defendant's attempts to flee the
presence of the officers all combined gave
rise to a reasonable and articulable
suspiscion [sic] which justified a temporary
seizure of defendant.
2. That such a temporary seizure occured
[sic] when defendant was required to exit his
truck by the police officers.
3. That the evidence of guns and other
weapons habitually associated with drug
dealers and the presence of weapons actually
found during the searches of the houses in
the area provided a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the defendant may
be armed and thus justified the pat-down
search of defendant's person and the cursory
search of his truck for weapons.
(R. at 22).
-ft-

This Court, in State v. Johnson, 771 I-, 2d 3 2ft ('Utah ct.
A

PP )i cert. granted,

^ F,2d _ _ (Utah 1989), set out the

standard for reviewing the adim hK iMlity of evidence in the
search and seizure context.

This Court said:

In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987). The trial judge is in the best
position to assess the credibility and
accuracy of the witnesses' divergent
testimonies. State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153,
154-56, (Utah Ct.App.1989); State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
"correction of error" standard. Oates v.
Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988).
771 P.2d at 327. Defendant has not challenged the factual
findings of the trial court, but has challenged the legal
conclusions drawn tioin those findings.

Consequently, this Court

reviews the matter under the correction of error standard.
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
this Court said:
A seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment occurs only when the officer by
means of physical force or show of authority
has in some way restricted the liberty of a
person.
73 9 P.2d at 87. As the trial court determined in the present
case, fU'lpfu

was seized when his vehicle was stopped and he

was not allowed to leave.

However, t.hi,- 'temporal yfieizire"or

detention was valid.
'T'tie United .States Supreme Court has on several
occasions explained and refined the law regarding seJ zui HI-, WIIJCJI
.,9.

do not rise to the level of a formal arrest.

Beginning in Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court addressed the question
"whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a
person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless
there is probable cause for an arrest."

392 U.S. at 15. The

Fourth Amendment right is judged by a reasonableness standard:
For "what the Constitution forbids is not all
searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures."
392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(I960)).

Without retreating from previous holdings that police

must, whenever practical, obtain prior judicial approval of
searches and seizures, the Court in Terry dealt with an area of
police conduct which could not be subjected to warrant procedures
as a practical matter.

392 U.S. at 20. To assess the

reasonableness of the police conduct,
it is necessary "first to focus upon the
governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected interests of the
private citizen," for there is "no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails." . . . And in justifying
the particular intrusion the police officer
must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.
392 U.S. at 20-21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 534-35 (1967)) (footnote omitted).

In assessing whether a

particular seizure is reasonable,
it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard: would the
facts available to the officer at the moment
-10-

of the seizure or the search "warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief" that the
action taken was appropriate?
392

at 21-22 (citations omitted).

The Court then determined

ti

sei zure and pat down in that case was reasonable in

light of the minimal intrusion involved balanced aga Ii ist t .1 le
nature of the governmental interest involved,
Sub sec:

392 U.S. at 27.

Michigan v. Summers/ 452 U.S. 692

(1981), the Court addressed a situation somewhat similar to the
present case.

In Summers, officers were approaching 3 house to

execute a search war i: ai it on the premises . On the front steps,
they encountered Summers, who was later determined to be the
owner of the house.

They requested his help in entering the

home, then detained turn wtu U 1 i hey searched t; he house ami found
narcotics in the basement.

After determining his ownership of

the house, the officers arrested Summers and searched him,
finding heroin in his coat pocket.

4h2 1), S

-if 6 C ^,

The Court

stated that "[t]he dispositive question in this case is whether
the initial detention of respondent violated his constitutional
right to be secure against an unreasonable seizure of hi:
person. M

452 U.S. at 894. l

footnote, the Court distinguished this circumstance
In the
from the search issue raised in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85
(1979). In Ybarra, "no question concerning the legitimacy of the
detention was raised." 452 U.S. at 696 n. 4. In Summers, "only
the detention is at issue." ni. Consequently, the search issue
raised in Ybarra is inapplicable to the detention issue in the
present case.
- 11. -

The Court recognized
that some seizures significantly less
intrusive than an arrest have withstood
scrutiny under the reasonableness standard
embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In these
cases the intrusion on the citizen's privacy
"was so much less severe" than that involved
in a traditional arrest that "the opposing
interests in crime prevention and detection
and in the police officer's safety" could
support the seizure as reasonable.
452 U.S. at 697-98 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
209 (1979)) (citations omitted).

Citing a list of their own

cases which supported detention or seizure on less than probable
cause, the Court reiterated that
[t]hese cases recognize that some seizures
admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment
constitute such limited intrusions on the
personal security of those detained and are
justified by such substantial law enforcement
interests that they may be made on less than
probable cause, so long as police have an
articulable basis for suspecting criminal
activity. In these cases, . . . the Court
was applying the ultimate standard of
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth
Amendment. . . . But they demonstrate that
the exception for limited intrusions that may
be justified by special law enforcement
interests is not confined to the momentary,
on-the-street detention accompanied by a
frisk for weapons involved in Terry and
Adams. Therefore, in order to decide whether
this case is controlled by the general rule,
it is necessary to examine both the character
of the official intrusion and its
justification.
452 at 699-701 (footnotes omitted).

In assessing the

justification for detaining an individual, "both the law
enforcement interest and the nature of the 'articulable facts'
supporting the detention are relevant."

452 U.S. at 702. One

important law enforcement interest is the prevention of flight.

-12-

Another interest "of greater importance, is the interest In
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers."

Id.

The Court

determine
the execution of a warrant to search for
narcotics is the kind of transaction that ilia]
give rise to sudden violence or frantic
efforts to conceal or destroy evidence. The
risk of harm to both the police and the
occupants is minimized if the officers
routinely exercise unquestioned command of
the situation. . . .
452 U.S. at 702-703 (footnotes omitted).

The Court held that a

warrant to search for contraband implicitly carried with it the
authority to detain occupants of the premises whi le the search
was conducted.

452 U.S. at 705.

The Court: in Summers also addressed the issue of a
forcible stop of an individual.
In upholding the "frisk" employed by the
officer in [the Terry] case, the Court
assumed, without explicitly stating, that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit forcible
stops when the officer has a reasonable
suspicion that a crime has been or is being
committed. See 392 U.S., at 32-33, . . . .
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. [143, 146
(1972)] . . ., the Court made explicit what
was implicit in Terry;
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual,
in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while
obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to
the officer at the time."
452

. at D:;O n.7.
In a case even, more analog

United States District Court in Indiana found basis in Terry for
detention c. f an i ud i «, i dun I H\ flu- perimeter of a search area.
United States v. Rivera, 738 :

.*ph
- 13-

n. m d . 1991:1),

In

officers had established a "perimeter" around a house for which
they had a search warrant.

The perimeter was established to

"secure [the house] so that no one could come in and no one could
leave while the warrant was being executed."
1215.

738 F.Supp. at

As some of the officers left the house, they saw Rivera,

the owner of the house, driving up.

The officers stopped their

vehicle near Rivera's and Rivera got out of his pickup, leaving
the driver's side door open.

The officers announced who they

were and detained Rivera at the rear of his pickup.

The officers

could see a brown paper bag on the floor of the cab of the truck.
As one officer patted down Rivera, the other approached the open
door of the pickup and saw that the paper bag, which was
partially under the driver's seat, was full of money.

The money

was seized and the seizure was upheld by the district court.

738

F.Supp. at 1214-15. Among the facts adduced at the suppression
hearing was that:
[i]t is common procedure for law enforcement
officers to secure the outside of the
premises being searched pursuant to a
warrant. It is also common procedure to
search an individual before allowing that
individual to enter the premises while the
search is being conducted.
738 F.Supp. at 1215.
Rivera under Terry.

The district court upheld the stop of
The court said:

A Terry stop is a brief investigatory
detention which allows law enforcement
personnel the opportunity to either verify or
dispel their "suspicions that a person has
been, is, or is about to be engaged in
criminal activity." . . . To justify a brief
limited intrusion under Terry, "the officer
must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts,
-14-

reasonably warrants that intrusion." . . .
Additionally, due weight must be given to the
specific reasonable inferences which an
officer is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience. . . . To determine
whether an officer's suspicion of criminal
activity is reasonable, a court must evaluate
the totality of the circumstances. . . .
738 F.Supp. at 1216 (quoting United States v. Boden, 854 F.2d
983, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968)) (citations omitted).

That the totality of the

circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether a
detention is reasonable was explained in United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411 (1981).

The Supreme Court stated:

[T]he assessment must be based upon all of
the circumstances. The analysis proceeds
with various objective observations,
information from police reports, if such are
available, and consideration of the modes or
patterns of operation of certain kinds of
lawbreakers. From these data, a trained
officer draws inferences and makes
deductions—inferences and deductions that
might well elude an untrained person.
The process does not deal with hard
certainties, but with probabilities. . • .
449 U.S. at 418.
In Rivera, the court determined that the investigative
stop was justified from the outset.

The court said:

First, maintaining the safety of the law
enforcement personnel inside the residence
conducting the search requires that officers
securing the outside of the premises take
steps to insure that no individual who enters
the residence while the search is being
conducted while armed with a firearm or any
other type of weapon. . . •
Second, many districts have recognized
that frequently where large quantities of
narcotics are involved, firearms are also
present. . . . Here, the actions taken by
[the officers] in stopping the defendant and
-15-

patting him down easily fall within the
bounds of a Terry stop as necessary to
protect not only their personal safety and
that of the law enforcement personnel still
inside the defendant's residence, but also to
maintain the status quo while seeking more
information,
738 F.Supp. at 1217 (citations omitted).
Protection of the public and of the officers is a valid
law enforcement concern which, when balanced with the intrusion
of the seizure, may justify detention of an individual.

An

argument, such as that raised by defendant below, that an
alternative, less intrusive means might have been used in that
case, does not make the detention unreasonable.

"The fact that

an investigative stop might, in the abstract, have been
accomplished by some less intrusive means does not, in and of
itself, render a stop unreasonable."

United States v. Alexander/

907 F.2d 269, 273 (2nd Cir. 1990) (citing United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985)).

As the court said in

Alexander:
There are no hard and fast rules for
evaluating the conduct of law enforcement
agents conducting investigative stops. . . .
A law enforcement agent, faced with the
possibility of danger, has a right to take
reasonable steps to protect himself and an
obligation to ensure the safety of innocent
bystanders, regardless of whether probable
cause to arrest exists. . . .
907 F.2d at 272 (citations omitted).
In the case now before this Court, the officers had
specific and articulable facts which, in the totality of the
circumstances, justified their stop of defendant's vehicle.
officers set up a perimeter to keep anyone from walking into
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The

houses being searched (R. 53 at 5-6 and R. 54 at 6). The
perimeter was set up at the entrance to the street rather than at
the houses because the street was a dead end cul-de-sac and three
of the six houses on the street were being searched (R. 53 at 6-8
and 22 and R. 54 at 6).

In addition, there were several vehicles

and officers involved in the searches, which left no room to
allow other vehicles into the cul-de-sac to park or to turn
around (R. 53 at 8 and R. 54 at 6).
Prior to defendant's arrival, the officers found a
functional methamphetamine lab in one of the houses searched,
chemicals for making methamphetamine in another of the houses,
and numerous weapons in all three of the houses (R. 53 at 11 and
R. 54 at 6).

Some of the officers had received special training

in drug labs and drug interdiction.

In the case of each of the

houses searched, the officers had conducted surveillance prior to
obtaining the search warrants (R. 53 at 32-33).

The officers

were aware that the traffic pattern at a drug house would
normally be a large volume of traffic, with short visits at the
house.

The peak hours for such visits were the hours of

darkness, usually the late evening hours (R. 53 at 34).
Methamphetamine labs required the delivery of a variety of
different chemicals and glassware.

The containers for these

items ranged from fifty pound boxes to one ounce containers (R.
53 at 35-36).

Pickups were often used to deliver the materials,

and many of the materials were very explosive (R. 53 at 36).
Most of the time, officers also found many types of weapons when
searching drug and lab houses (R. 53 at 37).
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Surveillance of the

three houses searched in this instance had shown that the normal
pattern was seen; there were periods of high traffic volume
during the evening and late hours (R. 53 at 39). The searches
had also turned up several types of weapons in all of the houses
(R. 53 at 39).
Because of the volatile nature of many of the chemicals
used in manufacturing methamphetamine, the presence of weapons in
the houses searched, the possibility that people coming into the
cul-de-sac would endanger the officers, and the possibility that
other people for whom arrest warrants had been obtained might
come to the houses during the search, the Metro officers asked
the SWAT team to establish a perimeter at the entrance to the
cul-de-sac (R. 53 at 39-41 and R. 54 at 6 and 19). The SWAT team
was asked to stop the vehicles and ascertain to which house the
individual was driving.

If it was to a house not involved in the

search, the individual was escorted to that house (R. 54 at 6).
If the person indicated one of the suspect houses as his or her
destination, the SWAT team was to pat the person down and check
the vehicle for weapons and hold the person until a Metro
detective arrived to determine if the person was wanted (R. 53 at
40 and R. 54 at 19).
When the intrusion on defendant is balanced with the
law enforcement interests, the detention of defendant was
reasonable.

The factors listed above were specific, articulable

reasons to stop defendant's truck.

When they are coupled with

the facts that defendant drove a pickup, which could have been
carrying chemicals for the lab, that defendant looked "panicky or
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startled," and that defendant tried to place his vehicle in
reverse when the officers identified themselves, the officers had
additional individualized, articulable reasons to further detain
and question defendant after the initial stop.

While this Court

has determined that an attempt to avoid a roadblock, by itself,
is not sufficient articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle, that
factor does not stand as the only justification for a stop in the
present case*

See State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 494-95 (Utah

Ct. App. 1990).
Given the totality of the circumstances in the stop of
defendant, the governmental interest in protecting the officers
and the public outweighed the intrusion on defendant when he was
detained while the officers checked his destination and checked
his person and vehicle for weapons.

The articulated reasons for

suspicion supported the stop of defendant.
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ANALYZED A CHALLENGE TO THE
SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE AND HAS WAIVED SUCH A
CHALLENGE. ONCE DEFENDANT WAS LAWFULLY
STOPPED, THE OFFICERS COULD PROPERLY PAT DOWN
DEFENDANT FOR WEAPONS.
In the headnote to point II in his brief, defendant
states that the searches of him and his vehicle were invalid
(Brief of Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 19). However,
defendant does not provide any legal analysis of a challenge to
the search of his vehicle.
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A.

Waiver.

The appellate courts of this state require that a
defendant support any argument he raises with legal analysis.

In

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
Since the defendant fails to support this
argument by any legal analysis or authority,
we decline to rule on it.
689 P.2d at 1344.

On the issue of the validity of the search of

his vehicle, defendant has merely stated that issue in the
headnote to point II of his brief.

The body of the point only

analyzes the validity of the search of defendant's person.
Consequently, this Court should decline to address the issue of
the validity of the vehicle search.
B.

Validity of the Search of Defendant.

Once defendant was lawfully stopped, the officers acted
reasonably in searching him and his personal effects.

Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny, "permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer,
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual." 392 U.S. 27.

See also Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("The Court recognized in
Terry that the policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop
should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from
attack by a hostile suspect"); State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 292
(Utah 1986).
The pat down of defendant for weapons prior to his
arrest was justified under the rule of Terry, Adams, and Roybal
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that an officer may conduct a pat down of the outer clothing of
an individual for weapons during an investigatory stop when the
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed
and dangerous.

Roybal, 716 P.2d at 292. Given the reasonable

suspicion that defendant was connected with one of a group of
houses which were involved in the manufacture of illegal drugs
and contained numerous weapons, the pat down of defendant for
weapons prior to his arrest was proper.

Under the circumstances,

the police had a reasonable suspicion that defendant, whom they
reasonably suspected of being involved in an enterprise where the
participants frequently carry weapons, was armed and dangerous.
Cf. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman,
J., concurring) (an officer "reasonably could assume that those
participating in moving large quantities of illegal drugs over
long distances might be armed to protect themselves from
2
criminals who might attempt to 'rip-off a drug dealer").
As noted above, defendant has not provided any analysis in
support of his challenge to the legality of the search of his
vehicle, and thus the Court should not address that issue.
However, even if this Court were to address the question of
whether the police were justified in searching defendant's
vehicle for weapons prior to his arrest but incident to the
investigatory stop, that cursory search for weapons was clearly
permissible under the analysis set forth in Justice Zimmerman's
concurring opinion in State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092-93
(Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). There, Justice
Zimmerman, joined by Justice Durham, relied on Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983), to justify the limited search of the
defendant's automobile for weapons incident to an investigatory
stop of the vehicle. In Long, the Court concluded that a search
of the
passenger compartment of an automobile,
limited to those areas in which a weapon may
be placed or hidden, is permissible if the
police officer possesses a reasonable belief
based on "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational
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As for the search of defendant and his clothing after
his arrest, it is well settled that a person may be searched
incident to his arrest for weapons, contraband, or other evidence
of the commission of a crime.

United States v. Robinson, 414

U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
In the present case, the search of defendant and his
clothing did not occur until after the officers had found
marijuana in defendant's vehicle.after Detective Huggard saw
marijuana in defendant's vehicle and placed defendant under
arrest for possession of a controlled substance (R. 53 at 42 and
R. 54 at 26-28), he spoke briefly to defendant and then picked up
a jacket which was lying on the seat of the pickup.

He intended

to give it to defendant to put on because it was cold standing
next to the pickup (R. 53 at 43 and R. 54 at 29).

Defendant told

the detective that the jacket was his, but before Huggard handed
it to him, Huggard checked it for weapons (R. 53 at 43 and R. 54
at 30). He felt a hard object in the upper right pocket which
he associated with a wallet containing a .22 caliber derringer,
something he had found in the past.

Because of this association

and his concern that the object might contain a weapon, Detective
Huggard pulled the object out of the pocket.

He found that it

contained a large sum of money and a bindle of a powdery
2

Cont.
inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant" the officer in believing that the
suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain
immediate control of weapons. . • .

463 U.S. at 1049.
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substance which was later analyzed to be methamphetamine (R. 53
at 43 and R. 54 at 30-31).

This search was appropriate as a

search incident to arrest.
After defendant was arrested by Detective Huggard,
another officer was called to the area of the stop to secure
defendant and two others who had been arrested.

Detective James

Evans was called from the search to take custody of the three
individuals and hold them until they could be transported from
the scene (R. 54 at 60-62).

Because he was not the one who had

arrested and handcuffed defendant, and as a safety precaution,
Detective Evans searched defendant's person.

In defendant's

front jeans pocket, Evans found $1257.00 (R. 54 at 62). This
search was also proper as a search incident to arrest.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly
denied defendant's motion to suppress, and the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and
sentences.

.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 891901609FS

MICHAEL D. STEWARD,

Honorable Michael R. Murphy

Defendant•

Defendant Michael D. Steward's Motion to Suppress Evidence
obtained during the search of his person and vehicle came before
this Court for a hearing on January 2, 1990, The Honorable Judge
Michael R. Murphy presided.

Defendant

represented

Ray

by

his

counsel,

Steward being present and

Stoddard,

and

the

State

being

represented by Paul B. Parker, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, and
the parties having presented their evidence and arguments and the
Court being fully advised of the premises thereof, enters its:

FINDINGS
1.

That on August 20, 1989, Detective Alex Huggard of the

Metropolitan Narcotics Unit and other officers including Sergeant
Russell Adair from the Salt Lake City SWAT Team executed a series of
search warrants upon several houses on a dead end street in Bingham
Canyon.

One

of

those

buildings

was

found

to

contain

a drug

laboratory in which methamphatamine drugs were produced.

The others

were

controlled

belived

to

be

involved

in

the

distribution

of

substances.
2.

That

chemicals

and

equipment

used

in

such

a drug,

laboratory are transported to the laboratory in pickup trucks and
vans.
3.

-That customers

of

drug

laboratories, and

controlled

substances distributors, frequently use the late evening hours to
make their purchases from the drug distributors.
4.

That at approximately 11:50 p.m., Sergeant Russell Adair

and others of the Salt Lake City SWAT Team set up a check point at
/

the entrance to the dead end street in Bingham Canyon.
officers,

although

wearing

military-camouflage

type

That the

uniforms had

patches and other police insignia on their uniforms.
5.

That defendant

pickup truck.

drove onto the dead end street

in a

That as the officers approached defendant's car and

identified themselves, defendant stopped and quickly tried to back
out of the street.

That once stopped, defendant said he was going

to one of the houses being searched by police officers.
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6.

That

Sergeant Adair

and Detective Huggard

had

already

found guns and weapons in two of the houses searched on that day.
That

guns

and

weapons

are

frequently

associated

with

drug

trafficking.
7.
car

and

That Sergeant Adair asked defendant to step out of the

then

conducted

a pat-down

search

of

defendant's

person.

That other officers at the same time, searched the cab of the truck
for

weapons.

That

during

the

search

of

the

cab

of

defendant's

truck, marijuana and other items incriminating defendant were found.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That evidence showing that defendant approached the area

in a pickup • truck, which

vehicle was consistent

with

those types

used to deliver chemicals and supplies to the drug laboratory, and
the

time

shows

is

of

day

the

defendant's

being

time

of

attempts

late

in the evening

choice
to

flee

for
the

hours, which

evidence

customers

of

drug

dealers,

and

presence

of

the

officers

all

combined gave rise to a reasonable and articulable suspiscion which
justified a temporary seizure of defendant.
2.

That such a temporary seizure occured when defendant was

required to exit his truck by the police officers.
3.

That the evidence of guns and other weapons habitually

associated with drug dealers
found

during

the

searches

of

and
the

the presence of weapons
houses

in

the

area

actually

provided a

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant may be armed
and thus justified the pat-down search of defendant's person and the
cursory search of his truck for weapons.

4.

Accordingly

evidence obtained

during

the searches of

defendant's person and of his vehicle was lawfully obtained.

Q R P E R
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law

it

is

hereby

evidence obtained

Ordered

that

Defendant's

Motion

in the searches of his person

denied.

to

Suppress

and vehicle is

.
DATED this *T

day of January, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

fh^U /?, /I
The Honorable Michael W. Murphy
Judge of the Third District Court
Approved as to form
and content:

RAY STODDARD
Attorney for Defendant

